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court will have notice of the law which would be applied in the
transferor court on an important issue, thereby minimizing the
difficulties inherent in the former's determination and applica-
tion of the law and policy of the state of the transferor court.35
This discussion of considerations involved in a transfer under
section 1404 (a) is particularly important in Louisiana because
of its civil law tradition. It is not difficult to suppose a case
in which interpretation or construction of civilian institutions
would be crucial to parties litigating here. There is little likeli-
hood that judges sitting in federal courts in common law juris-
dictions will have the same expertise as a Louisiana judge in
civil law generally, or Louisiana civil law in particular. This is a
factor that may militate against transfer to a district court
sitting in a common law jurisdiction. If transfer is ultimately
granted, it may be advisable for the federal district court sitting
in Louisiana to insure the clarity of the applicable law by either
a transfer conditioned upon stipulation of the parties, or a pro-
nouncement on the applicable law of Louisiana.
Richard B. Wilkins, Jr.
LEASES - SALE OF LEASE DISTINGUISHED FROM SALE OF
RIGHT OF OCCUPANCY
Plaintiff and defendant entered a lease agreement contain-
ing an acceleration clause. Upon nonpayment of rent by defend-
ant, plaintiff obtained judgment for rent past due and rent for
the unexpired term of the lease. The judgment recognized plain-
tiff lessor's privilege on defendant's movables situated on the
leased premises. National Cash Register intervened, asserting
a vendor's privilege and chattel mortgage on several cash reg-
isters which had been placed on the leased premises prior to
recordation of the chattel mortgage. By virtue of a writ of fieri
facias, both the right of occupancy and defendant's movables,
35. The feasibility of such a pronouncement will depend upon the stage of
the proceedings in the transferor court. If the proceeding is in the preliminary
pleading stage, it may be difficult or impossible for the court to isolate issues
of law which may be determinative of the case. This dilemma would appear to
be a factor which militates against transfer. See Chenoweth v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
R.R., 229 F. Supp. 540 (D. Colo. 1964), where the transferee court transferred
the action back to the transferor court, as the original transfer was premature
in view of the complex issues of law which could most expeditiously be isolated
and decided 'by the transferor court at a later stage in proceedings there.
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including the cash registers, were seized and sold to satisfy
plaintiff's judgment. The right of occupancy was adjudicated
to plaintiff before the cash registers were sold. Intervenor con-
tended that plaintiff's purchase of the "lease" before adjudica-
tion of the seized movables extinguished the lease by confusion,
resulting in loss of plaintiff's privilege on the unsold movables.
Held, purchase of the right of occupancy by the lessor extin-
guished the lease; however, since the lessor's privilege is security
for the obligation to pay rent and since the obligation to pay
rent became merged into the judgment, the lessor's privilege
became security for payment of the judgment and thus was not
extinguished. Morrison v. Faulk, 158 So. 2d 837 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1963).
To secure payment of rent the Civil Code provides the lessor
with a privilege and right of pledge on the lessee's movables
found on the leased premises.' The courts have uniformly held
that the lessor's privilege attaches as soon as the movables are
placed on the leased property.2 Article 3263 of the Civil Code
ranks the lessor's privilege superior to a vendor's privilege on
movables remaining in the possession of the vendee.3 Similarly,
the lessor's privilege primes a chattel mortgagee's claim if the
mortgaged property is placed on the leased premises before
recordation of the mortgage. 4 However, if the chattel mortgage
1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2705 (1870): "The lessor has, for the payment of
his rent, and other obligations of the lease, a right of pledge on the movable
effects of the lessee, which are found on the property leased." See id. arts. 3217-
3219.
2. See, e.g., Youree v. Limerick, 157 La. 39, 101 So. 864 (1924) ; Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Parker, 117 So.2d 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
3. LA. CIVL CODE art. 3263 (1870) : "The privilege of the vendor on movables
sold by him which are still in the possession of the vendee, yields to that of the
owner of the house or farm which they serve to furnish or supply, for his rents."
4. See LA. R.S. 9:5353-5354 (Supp. 1964). 9:5354 provides: "Every such
mortgage shall be effective as against third persons from the time of filing in
the proper offices, and the filing shall be notice to all parties of the existence
of the mortgage, which shall be superior in rank to any privilege or preference
arising subsequently thereto." (Emphasis added.)
The lessor's privilege attaches as soon as movables are placed on the leased
premises. Consequently, when the mortgage is recorded prior to placing the.
mortgaged movables on the leased premises, R.S. 9:5354 applies ranking the
chattel mortgage ahead of the lessor's privilege. On the other hand, the courts
have applied R.S. 9.5354 conversely: if the mortgaged movables are placed on
the leased premises before recordation of the mortgage, the lessor's privilege will
prime the chattel mortgage. See, e.g., Smith v. Bratsos, 202 La. 493, 12 So. 2d
245 (1942) ; Union Bldg. Corp. v. Burmeister, 186 La. 1027, 173 So. 752 (1937) ;
White v. Hammond Stage Lines, 180 La. 962, 158 So. 353 (1934) ; Comegys v.
Shreveport Kandy Kitchen, 162 La. 103, 110 So. 104 (1926) ; Youree v. Limerick,
157 La. 39, 101 So. 864 (1924); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Parker, 117
-So. 2d 660 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1960).
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is recorded before the movables are placed on the leased prem-
ises, the chattel mortgagee will prevail.5
According to the jurisprudence, a lease is composed of two
main parts: the right to enjoy the leased premises (the right
of occupancy) ; and the obligation to pay rent.6 Furthermore,
the courts have held that the right of occupancy can be severed
from the obligation to pay rent.7 Thus the sale of the right of
occupancy merely conveys the right of enjoyment without the
obligation to pay rent,8 whereas the sale of a lease transfers the
obligation to pay rent as well as the right to enjoy the leased
premises.9 Finally, the jurisprudence supports the proposition
that the purchase of the lease by the lessor operates to extin-
guish the lease by confusion since the correlative rights and
duties are united in a single person, the lessor.10
5. See note 4 supra. An interesting problem arises if the mortgage is recorded
before the beginning of the term of the lease but after the lease agreement has
been signed. The courts have allowed the chattel mortgagee to prevail. See In re
Ruston Creaniery, 190 La. 681, 182 So. 715 (1938) ; Hardie v. Wright, 125 So.
312 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
6. In Walker v. Dohan, 39 La. Ann. 743, 744, 2 So. 381, 382 (1887), the
court stated: "The contract embodies, in itself, reciprocal rights and obligations -
the right of enjoyment and the obligation of paying rent."
7. Ranson v. Voiron, 176 La. 718, 146 So. 681 (1933) ; Villavaso v. Creditors,
48 La. Ann. 946, 20 So. 167 (1896) ; Schwartz v. Saiter, 40 La. Ann. 264, 4 So.
77 (1888) ; Walker v. Dohan, 39 La. Ann. 743, 2 So. 381 (1887) ; Lehman v.
Dreyfus, 37 La. Ann. 587 (1885) ; Brinton v. Datas, 17 La. Ann. 174 (1865) ;
D'Aquin v. Armant, 14 La. Ann. 217 (1859) ; Bartels & Dana v. Creditors, 11 La.
Ann. 433 (1856) (dissent) ; Succession of Howard, 2 Orl. App. 163 (La. App.
Orl. Cir. 1905).
8. See note 7 supra. The dissent in Bartels has often been quoted when the
need arose to distinguish between the sale of a lease and the sale of the right of
occupancy: "There are two ways of selling the unexpired term of a lease; one by
selling it for a premium, subject to the payment of rent to the landlord, the other
by selling or assigning the right of occupation without the assumption of the rent."
Bartels & Dana v. Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 433, 437 (1856).
9. See note 7 supra. Additionally, neither the lease nor the right of occupancy
is subject to the lessor's privilege since neither is classified as a movable. See
Henry Rose Mercantile & Mfg. Co. v. Stearns, 154 La. 946, 98 So. 429 (1923) ;
Brunner Mercantile Co. v. Rodgin, 130 La. 358, 57 So. 1004 (1912). An interest-
ing problem arises when the right of occupancy is seized by a third person and
not by the lessor. In Loyacano v. Villere & Burglass, 6 La. App. 37 (Orl. Cir.
1927), the lessor obtained a judgment for the full term of the lease and seized
movables on the leased premises to satisfy his judgment. Subsequently, the lessor
attempted to cancel the lease after the right of occupancy had been seized by a
general creditor. The court denied the lessor's claim since the right of occupancy
had been seized by a third person recognizing that the right of occupancy was
subject to seizure by any general creditor under a writ of fieri facias. In Loyacano,
the lessor had the opportunity to seize and purchase the right of occupany, which
would terminate the lease. However, his inaction allowed a third person to seize
the right of occupany, thereby preventing the lessor from doing so.
10. See Villavaso v. Creditors, 48 La. Ann. 946, 20 So. 167 (1896) ; Bartels
& Dana v. Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 433 (1856). However, when a third person
purchases the lease, he obligates himself to pay the purchase price of the lease
to the lessee and rent to the lessor. See Schwartz v. Salter, 40 La. Ann. 264, 4
NOTES
In the instant case, National Cash Register introduced a
novel argument in support of its claim. First, intervenor con-
tended that the entire lease was purchased by the lessor, thereby
extinguishing the lease by confusion.1 1 Second, intervenor as-
serted that since the lessor's privilege arises out of the lease,
extinguishment of the lease operates to extinguish the lessor's
privilege. Intervenor concluded that plaintiff's purchase of the
lease before adjudication of the cash registers terminated the
lease at the moment of sale, causing the loss of plaintiff lessor's
privilege on the unsold cash registers and thus the proceeds
from the sale of the cash registers could not be applied to plain-
tiff's judgment.
In rejecting intervenor's first contention, the court reasoned
that the judgment for rent for the unexpired term of the lease
replaced, or was substituted for, the obligation to pay rent. In
other words, although the lessee retained the obligation to
satisfy the judgment, the obligation to pay rent had been satis-
fied by procurement of the judgment for rent for the full term
of the lease. Accordingly, the lessor could not have purchased
the lease, since the right of occupany was the only element of
the lease remaining after the obligation to pay rent had been
satisfied. Nevertheless, extinguishment of the lease was still
possible for the right of occupancy remained in the patrimony
of the lessee subject to seizure and sale. Consequently, plain-
tiff's purchase of the right of occupancy extinguished the lease
but not by uniting the qualities of debtor and creditor in the
lessor as intervenor contended. Had the lease been purchased
by the plaintiff, he would have assumed the obligation to pay
rent which would have been an anomalous result, since plaintiff
had previously obtained a judgment for the whole of the rent.12
So. 77 (1888) ; Lehman v. Dreyfus, 37 La. Ann. 587 (1885) ; Brinton v. Datas,
17 La. Ann. 174 (1865) ; D'Aquin v. Armant, 14 La. Ann. 217 (1859).
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2217 (1870) : "When the qualities of debtor and cred-
itor are united in the same person, there arises a confusion of right, which ex-
tinguishes the obligation." Intervenor was contending that the obligation to pay
rent was purchased as well as the right of occupancy which resulted in confusion
of the lease.
12. However, such a result occurred in Bartels & Dana v. Creditors, 11 La.
Ann. 433 (1856). The lessor obtained a judgment for the unexpired term of the
lease and then proceeded to purchase the unexpired term at the sheriff's sale. The
court held that the lease was extinguished by confusion and the lessor had assumed
the obligation to pay rent for the unexpired term of the lease. Thus the lessor's
judgment was reduced by the amount of rent for the unexpired term of the lease
plus the purchase price that the lessor paid for the unexpired term. The decision
produced a strong dissent which pointed out that it was much more plausible that
the lessor had purchased the right of occupancy and not the lease. The dissenting
':1965]
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More significantly, the court recognized the apparent impro-
priety of adopting the intervenor's second contention. The court
declared that since the lessor's privilege was security for pay-
ment of the rent and since the obligation to pay rent was re-
placed by the obligation to pay the judgment, the lessor's privi-
lege became security for payment of the judgment. Had the
court adopted intervenor's argument, the lessor would be pro-
hibited from asserting his privilege after extinguishment of the
lease. For example, assume that the lessor sued for past due
rent and cancellation of the lease. Applying intervenor's argu-
ment, after the lessor had obtained the judgment for past due
rent and cancellation of the lease, the lessee's movables which
were sequestered previously, or seized under a writ of fieri
facias, could not be sold to satisfy the judgment since the lessor's
privilege was extinguished with the cancellation of the lease.
Such a result is unquestionably inconsistent with the purpose
of the lessor's privilege as security for the obligation to pay
rent. 3
Undoubtedly, the result reached in the instant case was
sound. However, it is questionable whether the formalistic ap-
proach utilized by the court was necessary for a disposition of
the case. An alternative approach would have been to emphasize
that the purpose of the lessor's privilege is to secure payment
of rent, whether the obligation to pay manifests itself as rent
or has taken the form of a judgment.
Gordon E. Rountree
judge declared that the lessor had certainly not intended to pay a substantial
premium for the purpose of reducing the debt owed him by the lessee.
13. A similar factual situation was found in Ranson v. Voiron, 176 La. 718,
146 So. 681 (1933), the only difference being that the movables seized under the
lessor's privilege were sold before the lessor purchased the right of occupancy. In
Ranson the court declared that the lease was terminated by confusion. However,
the court continued: "[T]he cancellation, in such a case, does not have the retro-
active effect of destroying the lessor's lien on movable property which has been
seized and sold by the sheriff and bought by the lessor in part satisfaction of his
claim for rent." Id. at 722, 146 So. at 682. Such language indicates that the
Ranson court may have reached a different result had the right of occupancy been
sold prior to adjudication of the movables. The court in the instant case recog-
nized this possibility and correctly rejected it.
[Vol. XXV
